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Tribal Court Jurisdiction and Public
Law 280: What Role for Tribal Courts
in Alaska?
SUSANNE DI PIETRO*
This article discusses the legal issues implicated by claims of tribal
court jurisdiction, without advocating a particular resolution of
those issues. The article provides an historical and legal overview
of the sovereignty status of Alaska Native tribes. The remainder
of the article explores the legal effects of Public Law 83-280 on
tribal court jurisdiction in Alaska and discusses general principles
of tribal court jurisdiction and how they might apply in Alaska.
I. INTRODUCrION
It is not widely known outside of rural Alaska that as of 1993
at least one hundred Alaska Native villages were operating tribal
councils or tribal courts that resolve local disputes as their primary
or major functions.' Moreover, tribal court and council dispute
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resolution activity in Alaska reportedly has increased substantially
over the past six years.'
The increase in, and the range of, tribal dispute resolution
activity in Alaskan villages raise interesting and important legal
issues about tribal court jurisdiction and authority. Although a
federal line of authority recognizes the existence and jurisdiction of
at least some tribal courts in Alaska,3 the State of Alaska does
not.4 The purpose of this article is to explain the legal issues
implicated by claims of tribal court jurisdiction without advocating
a particular resolution of those issues.
Because many Alaska Native tribes base their authority and
jurisdiction to operate tribal courts on their status as sovereign
entities,' a threshold issue for this discussion of tribal court
jurisdiction is whether Alaska Native tribes have sovereign status.
The sovereignty debate is presented here first to set the context for
the analysis of tribal court jurisdiction. The remainder of the
article explores the legal effects of Public Law 83-280 on tribal
court jurisdiction in Alaska and discusses general principles of
tribal court jurisdiction and how they might apply in Alaska.
II. TRIBAL COURTS IN ALASKA
A. History of Tribal Courts and Village Councils
Village councils, composed of chiefs, elders or elected
representatives of the local community, were first organized around
the turn of the twentieth century.6 The councils typically had
authority in a wide range of village affairs, "and could be character-
2. Id. at 3. The Judicial Council expects this rapid rate of change to continue.
Id. The increase may be related in part to the fact that around 1986 the
Administration for Native Americans within the federal Department of Health and
Human Services targeted Alaska Native tribes for special consideration in making
grants for tribal self-determination, including the formation of tribal courts. 51
Fed. Reg. 36,517 (1986).
3. See infia notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
4. See infia notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
5. RESOLVING DISPuTfES LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 29.
6. Id. at 10. The development of councils apparently was encouraged by
missionaries, teachers and other government officials. Id. Before contact with the
non-Native community, Alaska Native groups governed themselves and resolved
their disputes through a variety of social/political and family structures. Id. at 7.




ized as combining the executive, legislative and judicial functions
into one organization."7 After the newly formed State of Alaska
instituted a unified court system in 1959,8 the councils continued
to play a role in village life;9 by the 1970's, however, the roles of
many councils were changing substantially, ° and other councils
were falling into disuse."
At least within the past six or seven years that the Alaska
Judicial Council has been studying the issue, a number of villages
have revived the tribal council structure for dispute resolution, and
in some instances have begun to formalize the dispute resolution
activities of these councils into tribal courts.'2 Supported by the
regional tribal organizations (commonly referred to as Native non-
profit corporations) and the federal Administration for Native
Americans, and working cooperatively in many places with state
government employees, the tribal councils and tribal courts
typically work on Indian Child Welfare Act cases, handle tradition-
al adoptions, enforce local ordinances (mainly alcohol control and
minor criminal matters) and generally maintain community
harmony. 3
In 1992, the Alaska Judicial Council evaluated two well-
established tribal courts, the Minto and Sitka Tribal Courts.'4 The
7. Id. at 11.
8. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 1.
9. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 12-13.
10. Id. at 21-22.
11. Id. The councils' roles may have been undermined in villages where the
Alaska court system maintained a presence. See id. at 60. However, the court
system does not maintain a strong presence in rural Alaska. "Judicial officers,
including full or part-time magistrates live in only about fifty locations, or fewer
than one-quarter of the State's communities." IML at 28. Residents in the other
communities tend to have very infrequent contact with the courts. Id
12. Id. at 3. The most common arrangement involves villages that use Indian
Reorganization Act ("IRA") councils or traditional councils to adjudicate disputes
as the need arises. Some villages operate tribal courts, however, that are separate
entities from the tribal councils. Id at 29-30.
13. Id. at 31.
14. See TERESA W. CARNS ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY:
ALTERNATIVES FOR RURAL ALASKA 19 (1992) (on file with the Alaska Judicial
Council) [hereinafter RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY I]. Minto is an Athabascan
village of approximately 218 in Interior Alaska. Id at 21. The Sitka Tribal Court
is operated by the Sitka Tribe of Alaska. Id. at 93. The Council's study, funded
by the State Justice Institute, also evaluated PACT, a multi-cultural conciliation
project operating in Barrow.
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Council found the courts to be low-cost, volunteer-staffed organiza-
tions that respond effectively to local needs for handling child and
family cases, and enforcing local ordinances.'5 In 1993, the
Council expanded on its earlier work by surveying all tribal dispute
resolution activity in Alaska. The resulting report shows that
residents of more than one hundred Alaska villages and communi-
ties take at least some of their disputes to local tribal councils or
tribal courts for resolution. 6 On the basis of its observations, the
Council concluded that because village residents participate
voluntarily in tribal court and council proceedings, most of these
organizations have operated without formal legal challenge to their
authority and jurisdiction.'
B. Tribal Status and Tribal Court Authority
Many Alaska Native villages base their claim of authority for
tribal courts and councils to make legally binding decisions on an
assertion of sovereign tribal status.'8 As a general principle of
Indian law, Indian tribes are qualified to exercise powers of self-
government by virtue of their original tribal sovereignty. 9 Thus,
the question of whether Alaska Natives are sovereign tribes is
important to a discussion of tribal court jurisdiction. Tribal
advocates and the State have debated extensively whether Alaska
Native villages are tribes for purposes of determining tribal
sovereign status and the rights and responsibilities which flow from
that status. Because the issue is a factual one2' that arises only on
15. Id. at ES-7 to ES-11. The tribal courts serve non-Natives as well as
Natives, either because the non-Natives are related through marriage to Natives
or because (in Minto) they live in the community. Id. at ES-10.
16. See RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 90-92 tbl. 2.
17. Id. at 30; RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at ES-8. Note
that non-Native residents also submit voluntarily to tribal jurisdiction. See id. at
ES-8; RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 74 n.142.
18. RESOLVING DIsPUTEs LOCALLY I, supra note 1, at 29.
19. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed.).
20. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1988).
338 [Vol. 10:2
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a case-by-case basis,21 the federal and state courts have failed to
comprehensively resolve the issue for Alaska Natives.'
Under general principles of federal Indian law, tribal status can
be recognized in any of three ways: (1) directly by Congress,
through statute or treaty; (2) by the executive branch, through
mechanisms such as the federal acknowledgment process; or (3)
judicially.' The legal issues concerning the sovereign powers of
Alaska Natives are complicated by the unique history of federal-
tribal and State-tribal dealings in Alaska.24 In the lower forty-
eight states, the federal government's interaction with tribes usually
involved the formation of treaties that recognized the tribes'
historical sovereign status.' Because the federal government did
not make treaties directly with Alaska Natives,26 however, the
21. See, e.g., Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757
P.2d 32, 41 (Alaska 1988) ("We conclude that Stevens Village is not entitled to
utilize the defense of tribal sovereign immunity."); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d
151, 156 (Alaska 1977) ("The reservation status of the Metlakatla Indian
Community sets them apart from other Alaska Natives[,] and... the status of the
Metlakatla Indian Community has always more closely resembled the status of the
tribe in other states.").
22. See Native Village of Tyonek y. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1992)
(superseding 953 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e have not addressed the question
whether any Alaskan native village constitutes an Indian tribe for the purpose of
sovereign immunity.... [W]e must remand so that an adequate record can be
prepared so that we may review this 'complex factual question."') (citation
omitted)); Nenana Fuel Co. v. Native Village of Venetie, 834 P.2d 1229, 1234
(Alaska 1992) (Moore, J., concurring) ("To date, no court has expressly considered
whether a Native group which once resided on a federally recognized reservation
in Alaska constitutes a sovereign Indian tribe after the passage of the [Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act].").
23. See generally United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); United States
v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (8 Wall.) 407 (1865); United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d
1368 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982); Mashpee Tribe v. New
Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
24. Governmental Jurisdiction of Alaska Native Villages over Land and
Nonmembers, Opinions of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. M-36,975
3 (Jan. 11, 1993) [hereinafter Op. Solicitor].
25. COHEN, supra note 19, at 62-74.
26. Alaska was owned by Russia for most of the treaty-making period of the
United States, which officially ended in 1871. Id. at 107. Russia sold its interest
in what is now Alaska to the United States in the 1867 Treaty of Cession. See
Treaty of Cession, March 30, 1867, U.S.-Russia, 15 Stat. 539 [hereinafter 1867
Treaty].
While Alaska Natives were not signatories to the Treaty of 1867, they are
expressly mentioned in the agreement. Article Im1 of the Treaty provides that the
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parties in the debate over tribal status for Alaska Native villages
have relied on other historical factors to argue the issue.
Tribal advocates contend that federal Indian law principles,
including the test for sovereign tribal status, apply equally to all
tribes in the United States, including Alaska Natives.' They
argue that beginning with the language in the Treaty of Cession
and continuing with ANCSA and over forty other post-ANCSA
statutes, Congress and the executive branch of the federal govern-
ment have recognized Alaska Natives' tribal status by treating
Alaska Natives similarly to other Indians, despite any historical
differences." Thus, according to their argument, "because Alaska
Native villages historically were ethnological tribes, and because
their consequent legal tribal status has never been terminated by
the federal government or voluntarily abandoned by the villages,
the villages necessarily continue to have the legal status of
'tribes."' 29
In Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska," the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated its willingness to consider
this reasoning. After considering the legal-historical basis justifying
recognition of sovereign tribal status, the Ninth Circuit concluded:
"[T]o the extent that Alaska's natives formed bodies politic to
"inhabitants" of the ceded territory (except uncivilized Native tribes) could choose
to "be admitted to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of
citizens of the United States," and that the "uncivilized tribes" of the Territory will
be "subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to
time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country." Id. at 542.
27. Eric Smith & Mary Kancewick, The Tribal Status of Alaska Natives, 61 U.
COLO. L. REv. 455, 499-500 (1990). In this context, they argue that the Treaty of
Cession, signed by the United States government, provides that the laws of the
United States will apply to the "civilized tribes" in Alaska in the same manner as
they apply to Indians in other states. Id. at 500.
28. Memorandum from Native American Rights Fund to Lynn Forcia, Chief
of Bureau of Indian Affairs' Branch of Acknowledgement and Research 25-39
(1992) (in support of request to rescind, correct and republish Bureau of Indian
Affairs' 1988 list of federally recognized tribes) (on file with author); Letter from
Lloyd B. Miller, an Anchorage attorney with Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Miller,
Munson and Clocksin, whose practice emphasizes Native law, to Kenton Pettit,
Alaska Law Review Editor-in-Chief, and Susanne Di Pietro, Alaska Judicial
Council Staff Attorney 3 (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with Alaska Law Review).
29. Smith & Kancewick, supra note 27, at 456 (footnote omitted). Smith and
Kancewick argue that the pattern of the federal relationship with Alaska Native
villages constitutes federal recognition of their tribal status as a matter of law.
30. 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
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govern domestic relations, to punish wrongdoers, and otherwise to
provide for the general welfare, we perceive no reason why they,
too, should not be recognized as having been sovereign entities."'"
The court refused to rule on the sovereignty issue, however, due to
the inadequate factual record developed in lower court proceed-
ings.32
The Venetie court also acknowledged that a sovereignty claim
will fail if Congress has affirmatively divested sovereignty status.33
Opponents of Alaska Native village sovereignty, including the State
of Alaska and private litigants,' raise this point to contest tribal
sovereignty. According to these groups, the United States
government's failure to sign treaties or create reservations for
Alaska Natives shows that Congress and the executive branch
never intended to recognize Alaska Natives as sovereign tribes.35
They further argue that even if Native villages were at one time
entitled to sovereign status, they relinquished that status by
accepting the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971
("ANCSA").36
31. Id. at 558 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 559. See also Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631, 635
(9th Cir. 1992) ("We cannot reach [the sovereignty issue] because... the district
court failed to enter express findings of facts or develop a record to support its
conclusion that the Native Village of Tyonek is an Indian tribe protected by
sovereign immunity."). Significantly, the district court in Native Village of Tyonek
had previously ruled that the Tyonek Village "is a tribe protected by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity." Id. at 633. Although this ruling did not ultimately
become the law of the case, it evinces judicial willingness to recognize the
sovereign status of an Alaska Native village.
33. Venetie I.R.A. Council, 944 F.2d at 558.
34. See, e.g., id. at 548 (State of Alaska opposing sovereignty claim); Nenana
Fuel Co. v. Native Village of Venetie, 834 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992) (Nenana Fuel
Co. opposing sovereignty claim).
35. See Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d
32, 35-36 (Alaska 1988) ("'There are not now and never have been tribes of
Indians in Alaska as that term is used in federal Indian law."' (quoting Metlakatla
Indian Community, Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 917-18 (Alaska
1961), rev'd in part, 369 U.S. 45 (1962))).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1988). See e.g., Nenana Fuel Co., 834 P.2d at
1238 (Moore, J., concurring); Native Village of Stevens, 757 P.2d at 41 ("ANCSA
abolishes all reservations in Alaska... [T]here is nothing in the legislative history
of ANCSA which remotely suggests that IRA villages are to be recognized as
having a government role."). "ANCSA was intended to resolve the land rights of
Alaska's eighty-thousand Native inhabitants." COHEN, supra note 19, at 740. By
its language, ANCSA extinguished any and all Native claims against the United
1993]
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In a child custody suit, In re EP,37 the Alaska Supreme
Court reaffirmed its position alongside the opponents of tribal
sovereignty, stating that "'the history of the relationship between
the federal government and Alaska Natives ... indicates that
Congress intended that most Alaska Native groups not be treated
as sovereigns."' 38 By refusing to follow federal precedent estab-
fished by the Ninth Circuit in Venetie,39 the Alaska Supreme Court
established a conflict on the sovereignty issue between the state
and federal courts.
In addition to the Alaska judicial branch's opposition to tribal
sovereignty, the state executive branch's official policy on Native
sovereignty is that "Alaska is one country, one people."4 Under
this policy, "[t]he State of Alaska opposes expansion of tribal
governmental powers and the creation of 'Indian Country' in
Alaska."41 The executive branch's current position differs from
the previous administration's position under Governor Cowper.
The Cowper Administration (1988-1991) established a tribal status
policy acknowledging that many, but not all, Native Alaskan groups
could qualify, even if they had not gone through the formal
process. The policy further acknowledged that tribes that do not
occupy reservations nevertheless possess some powers, but the
extent of those powers is not fully defined in the law.42
Because the state and federal courts dispute the sovereignty
issue and because the governor's view changed with a new adminis-
tration, the sovereignty debate remains lively and relevant to the
scope of tribal adjudicatory authority in Alaska.
States, the State of Alaska and other persons that were based upon aboriginal
right, title, use or occupancy of land in Alaska in exchange for 40 million acres of
land, approximately $462.5 million in congressional appropriations and $500
million in oil royalties. COHEN, supra note 19, at 740-41.
37. 843 P.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992).
38. Id. at 1215 (quoting Native Village of Stevens, 757 P.2d at 34).
39. See id. ("The decision in Native Village of Venetie fails to persuade us that
our prior cases should be overruled.").
40. Admin. Order No. 125 (1991) (signed by Gov. W.J. Hickel).
41. Id. The only group excepted from the current policy is the Metlakatla
Indian Tribe of the Annette Islands Reserve. For a discussion of the Metlakatla
Tribe and why its status is different from that of other Alaska Native villages, see
RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at 35 n.125.
42. See Admin. Order No. 123 (1990) (signed by Gov. Steve Cowper).
Subsequently, Governor Hickel revoked Administrative Order No. 123.
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III. NATURE AND EXTENT OF TRIBAL ADJUDICATORY
AUTHORrTY
Assuming for purposes of this discussion that the legal issues
eventually will be settled in favor of a finding of tribal status, what
authority would be recognized for their tribal courts? By virtue of
their historic status as self-governing political entities, tribes retain
full powers of internal sovereignty,43 except as expressly qualified
by the legislative power of the United States.' An expression of
this retained sovereignty is the principle that tribes have jurisdiction
over their members and territory.45 This authority is subject to
limitation by Congress, however, in the form of federal treaties,
agreements or statutes.46
One aspect of internal sovereignty that tribes retain, absent
congressional action or tribal waiver, is the power to maintain
"order and peace among their own members."'47 Tribes retain the
authority to adjudicate civil matters involving Indians within tribal
territory.' In criminal matters, the United States Supreme Court
held that tribes generally kept their jurisdiction to try an Indian for
43. A distinction is made between internal sovereignty, the right of tribes to
govern their internal affairs, and external sovereignty, for example, the power to
enter into treaties with foreign nations. Tribes lost most of their external powers
of sovereignty by virtue of their incorporation into the United States. COHEN,
supra note 19, at 244.
44. Id. at 241-42; see also Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
210 (1978).
45. As this principle suggests, "there is a significant territorial component to
tribal power." Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 142 (1982). The
territorial boundaries of tribal power generally are defined by the concept of
"Indian country." The concept of Indian country and the question of whether it
exists in Alaska are crucial to defining tribal court jurisdiction. See Op. Solicitor,
supra note 24, at 132 (concluding, among other things, that ANCSA largely
controls the determination of whether any territory exists over which Alaska
Natives can exercise governmental authority).
46. COEN, supra note 19, at 764.
47. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568 (1883).
48. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Fisher v.
District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d
1469 (9th Cir. 1989). The extent of tribes' authority over civil actions involving
non-tribal members within tribal territory is less clear; resolution of conflicts
between the jurisdiction of state and tribal courts seems to depend on "whether
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own




a crime committed against another Indian within Indian country;49
however, in 1885, in an exercise of its broad powers to regulate
Indian affairs,5 ° Congress assumed that jurisdiction by statute.5 1
Congress has passed other laws eroding tribal sovereignty in Indian
country.5 2
Congress also has exercised its authority to delegate certain
jurisdictional authority to the states. 3 Public Law 83-280 ("PL
280") is an example of a statute by which the federal government
delegated a measure of its jurisdictional authority to five selected
states- 4  It extends to the state courts jurisdiction to adjudicate
civil and criminal matters involving Indians in Indian country.5
Alaska Territory, originally not included in PL 280, was added to
it in 1958.5
49. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571-72.
50. COHEN, supra note 19, at 212. Congress also has a trust responsibility to
Indians, a responsibility that can act as a limitation on congressional power over
Indians. Id at 220-21.
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9,23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1988)).
52. Congress also defined federal court criminal jurisdiction over illegal
possession, sale or manufacture of liquor in Indian country. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154,
1156, 1161, 3055, 3113, 3488, 3669-70. As a matter of judicial construction,
however, "the courts have insisted upon a clear and specific expression of
congressional intent to extinguish traditional prerogatives of sovereignty" before
holding that a particular statute limits tribal powers. COHEN, supra note 19, at 242
& n.10.
53. COHEN, supra note 19, at 259, 361. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832). State jurisdiction generally is preempted both "by federal
protection of tribal self-government and by federal statutes on other subjects
relating to Indians." COHEN, supra note 19, at 349.
54. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 362. The original five states were California,
Minnesota (except the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the
Warm Springs Reservation) and Wisconsin (except the Menominee Reservation).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). Section 7 of PL 280
originally also set up a mechanism for any state to assume jurisdiction in Indian
country if it so desired. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, §7, 67 Stat.
588,590 (1953). However, this optional assumption provision was repealed in 1968
by the Civil Rights Act and replaced by a provision requiring tribes' consent to
any future assumption. See Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73,
78 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1983)).
56. See Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1984)). In the rest of this article, "PL 280" refers both to the
original law and to the 1958 amendments.
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Congress enacted PL 280 in 1953, during the time that the
Eisenhower administration had adopted the policy of terminating
the special federal-tribal relationship, with the ultimate goal of
assimilating Indians into American society. 7 Although the
legislative history is in some respects ambiguous, Congress's main
intent was to remedy a perceived lack of adequate law enforcement
on many reservations.58 The perceived lawlessness "was attributed
to the limited applicability of federal criminal laws and the
inadequacy of tribal law enforcement institutions."59 The grant of
civil jurisdiction apparently was something of an afterthought.'
In 1958, Public Law 85-6156 amended PL 280 and extended
Alaska's state court civil jurisdiction to private civil causes of action
involving Indians in Indian country.62 It also gave to Alaska's
state courts a measure of criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. 3
Other sections of the statute expressly preserved the legislative
authority of tribes when not inconsistent with applicable state civil
law,64 and specifically disclaimed any grant of power to the states
57. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANs,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 175 (1983).
58. COHEN, supra note 19, at 176.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 364; see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 381 (1976).
61. Act of Aug. 8,1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615,72 Stat. 545 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162(a) (1984)).
62. The civil jurisdictional grant of PL 280 provides that:
Each of the States listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over
civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties
which arise in the areas of Indian country listed.., to the same extent
that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those
civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons
or private property shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State:
Alaska .... All Indian country within the State.
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988).
63. For the language of the criminal jurisdictional grant, see infra note 112.
64. Section 1369(c) provides:
Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by an
Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority which
it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of
the State, be given full force and effect in the determination of civil
causes of action pursuant to this section.
28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (1988). One commentator has said that interpretation of this
provision is likely to depend on the meanings given "inconsistent" and "applica-
ble." DAVID S. CASE, ALASKA NATivES AND AMERICAN LAWS 454 (1984).
1993]
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to encumber or tax Indians and Indian properties held in federal
trust or restricted against alienation.'
The legislative history of Public Law 85-615 suggests that
Alaska was added to the list of PL 280 states in response to a 1957
opinion from the United States District Court in Anchorage
holding that the Territory of Alaska lacked jurisdiction to enforce
its criminal laws against Natives living on the Moquawkie Indian
Reservation (Tyonek) because the reserve was "Indian country., 66
By adding Alaska to the list, Congress appears to have intended
that the Territory continue to provide law enforcement in the
villages.67
IV. TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280
Interpretation of tribal court jurisdiction is complicated by the
question of whether Congress intended PL 280 to divest tribes of
their retained civil and criminal jurisdiction. Where this issue has
been litigated, tribal advocates have argued that PL 280 did not
preempt tribal court jurisdiction and that tribal courts may continue
to exercise their jurisdiction concurrently with the State.' The
State has argued, however, that the jurisdiction conferred on it by
PL 280 is exclusive.69
The following discussion of PL 280 is divided into separate
sections on criminal and civil jurisdiction. The general discussion
of civil jurisdiction contains sections dealing with two specific types
of cases: matters arising under the Indian Child Welfare Act and
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1988).
66. Petition of McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132 (D. Alaska 1957). According to one
source, when PL 280 originally was enacted, the federal and territorial govern-
ments had assumed that there was no Indian country in Alaska, and that Alaska
Natives in Native villages were subject to the criminal and civil laws of the
territorial government. REPORT OF THE GOvERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL-
STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS SUBMITTED TO GOVERNOR BILL SHEFFIELD 139-40
(1986) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE]; see also People
of S. Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Alaska 1979).
Others reject this conclusion, however, arguing that before the McCord decision,
state and federal authorities probably had never considered the issue. Letter from
Mary Kancewick to the Alaska Judicial Council (1991) (on file with Alaska
Judicial Council).
67. See S. REP. No. 1872, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 3347 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3347.
68. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Native Village of Nenana v. Department of Health & Social
Servs., 722 P.2d 219, 221 (Alaska 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986).
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civil regulatory matters. The criminal jurisdiction analysis includes
sections on the Indian Major Crimes Act and cases arising under
the Indian Civil Rights Act.
A. Jurisdiction over Civil Matters
PL 280 grants states jurisdiction over private civil litigation
involving Indians who reside on reservations to the same extent
that the State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action.70
Contrary to the State's position that the grant of jurisdiction is
exclusive, commentators have concluded that PL 280 did not
specifically extinguish any tribal court jurisdiction and, consequent-
ly, that Alaska Native villages may continue to exercise their
jurisdiction concurrently with the state.7 According to this view,
Congress intended to delegate through PL 280 only that jurisdiction
exercised by the federal government-that is, concurrent jurisdic-
tion over private civil litigation-and never intended to infringe
upon the tribes' inherent sovereign power to adjudicate civil
disputes among their members in their territory. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has noted that "to the extent that they have
addressed the issue" other mandatory PL 280 states have concluded
that tribal courts have concurrent civil jurisdiction.7'
1. Jurisdiction over Child Custody Matters. The viewpoint
that PL 280 was a broad grant of exclusive civil jurisdiction has
been asserted by Alaska in litigation involving the Indian Child
Welfare Act ("ICWA").73 Among other things, the Act regulates
tribal court jurisdiction of certain custody proceedings involving
Indian children.74 In ICWA, Congress declared that part of the
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988).
71. CASE, supra note 64, at 451-54; COHEN, supra note 19, at 367 ("It is...
probable that the jurisdiction of the tribes remains concurrent with the states in
Indian country subject to Public Law 280 to the same extent that it was concurrent
with the federal government prior to the Act.").
72. Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 561 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
Opinion No. 48, Opinion Letter from Robert M. Spire, Nebraska Attorney
General (Charles Lowe, Ass't Att'y General), to State Senator James E. Goll
(March 28, 1985), and 70 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 237, 243 (1981)).
73. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988).
74. Child custody proceedings represent about 16% of the Minto Tribal
Court's caseload and virtually all of the Sitka court's caseload. RESOLVING
DIsPuTES LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at 75, 101. The Sitka Tribal Court's child
custody proceedings, usually referred from the tribal social service agency, consist
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national policy of the United States is "to protect the best interests
of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by [establishing] minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families."'75
Among its provisions, ICWA requires that tribes be given
notice of involuntary proceedings in state court,76 and it codifies
tribes' right to intervene in certain state court child custody
proceedings.7 ICWA also provides that full faith and credit be
accorded to the laws and court orders of Indian tribes in these
matters, and establishes a preference that Indian children.be placed
with extended family or in other Indian homes if they must be
removed from their homes.7' ICWA expressly defines "Indian"
to include any person who is "an Alaska Native and a member of
a Regional Corporation" as defined in the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act.79
The debate over ICWA jurisdiction in Alaska centers around
the interpretation of PL 280 and Section 1918(a) of ICWA,
commonly referred to as the "reassumption of jurisdiction"
provision.' Section 1918(a) provides in relevant part:
mainly of guardianships. Id. at 103-05. The Minto Tribal Court's child custody
proceedings consist of traditional adoptions and, occasionally, mediated custody
arrangements. Id. at 86.
Generally, child custody proceedings under ICWA do not include voluntary
placements, such as voluntary, private adoptions, or state foster care placements
where the parent can regain custody at any time. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903(1)(i)-(iv)
(1988); see also D.E.D. v. State, 704 P.2d 774, 781 (Alaska 1985) (voluntary care
agreement did not fall under ICWA definition of "child custody proceeding").
Child custody proceedings under ICWA also do not include juvenile delinquent
cases or divorces. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
75. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
76. See id. § 1912(a). Notice, by registered mail or personal service, must be
given to the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe. Id. § 1912(a); ALASKA
CHILD IN NEED OF AID RULES 7(e)(1); Guidelines for State Courts, Indian Child
Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,588-89 (1979).
77. See id. § 1911(c). Some Alaska Native villages direct all ICWA notices to
the tribal court for review. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at
104; RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 74, 80. Some take an
active role in ICWA cases through their village councils. Id. at 40-41, 45, 52 n.114,
66, 69, 71, 77, 81-82, 87. Other villages authorize regional Native organizations to
intervene in ICWA cases on their behalf. Id. at 43.
78. COHEN, supra note 19, at 196; see generally Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
79. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) (1988).
80. Id. § 1918(a).
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Any Indian tribe which became subject to State jurisdiction
pursuant to the provisions of [PL 280] ... or pursuant to any
other Federal law, may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child
custody proceedings. Before any Indian tribe may reassume
jurisdiction ... , such tribe shall present to the Secretary for
approval a petition to reassume such jurisdiction which includes
a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdiction.81
The State contends that PL 280 divested tribes of all child custody
jurisdiction, arguing that the notion of reassumption necessarily
implies a previous divestiture.m The tribes contend that PL 280
divested tribes only of their traditional exclusive jurisdiction over
child custody matters, leaving them to share concurrent jurisdiction
with the State."
Two Alaska Supreme Court opinions support the view that
Indian child custody jurisdiction lies exclusively with the State; a
federal decision, however, holds that tribal court jurisdiction is
concurrent with Alaska state court jurisdiction. In the federal case,
Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska," two Alaska
Native villages sought to enjoin the State of Alaska from refusing
to recognize tribal court adoptions." The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held in favor of the villages, rejecting the State's argument
that congressional intent in enacting PL 280 was to give the states
exclusive child-custody jurisdiction and to divest the villages of any
inherent authority or sovereignty to make child-custody determina-
tions.8 6 The court concluded that PL 280 does not prevent any
Alaskan Native village from exercising concurrent jurisdiction with
81. Id.
82. Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 687 F. Supp. 1380,
1394-95 (D. Alaska 1988). Under the State's interpretation, no Alaska tribes are
currently eligible for jurisdiction because no tribal organizations in Alaska have
petitioned for or received the Secretary of the Interior's approval under Section
1918(a). The State apparently does not contest the tribal notification and
intervention provisions of ICWA; for example, the State notifies the Sitka court
and the Minto Tribal Council of involuntary child custody proceedings.
RESOLVING DIsPUTEs LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at 82, 103-04.
83. Native Village of Venetie, 687 F. Supp. at 1382-83.
84. 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
85. Id. at 551. Both parties agreed that the matter in controversy arose under
ICWA. Id.
86. Id. at 562. The court's analysis also implicitly rejected the State's position
that petitioning for and receiving approval from the Secretary of the Interior is the
only way for tribes to exercise ICWA jurisdiction.
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the State under ICWA if it can prove its status as a federally
recognized tribe.'
The Ninth Circuit holding conflicts with the Alaska Supreme
Court's earlier ruling in Native Village of Nenana v. Department of
Health & Social Services and with its later holding in In re ER
In Nenana, the court concluded that Nenana, which had neither
petitioned for nor received the Secretary of the Interior's permis-
sion to assume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings, lacked
jurisdiction to decide the case of an Indian child who had been
found to be in need of aid. 9 The court did not discuss the
sovereignty issue; it based its decision on the conclusion that
Congress intended PL 280 to divest tribes of all child custody
jurisdiction.' The court accepted the State's argument that
Congress would not have included a provision for reassuming
jurisdiction unless it intended to divest the tribes of jurisdiction in
the first place.9' Also evident in Nenana, however, is a concern
that tribes not be permitted to exercise jurisdiction in child custody
matters "until such time as there is satisfactory proof that a
particular tribe has the ability to adjudicate properly such cases."'
2. Civil Regulatory Authority over Tribal Members in Tribal
Territory. A special area of concern raised by PL 280's jurisdic-
tional grant is what authority the states have to enforce their own
regulatory laws against Indians living in Indian country. A related
question concerns the tribes' authority to enforce their own
ordinances against resident members and non-members. Both
questions are discussed below.
87. Id. The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to make these
factual determinations regarding tribal status. Id.
88. Native Village of Nenana v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 722
P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986); In re F.P., 843 F.2d 1214 (Alaska 1992). For a discussion
of In re F.P., see supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
89. Id. at 220.
90. Id. at 221.
91. Id. Note that the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected this reasoning in Venetie,
concluding that the Section 1918(a) reassumption provision applies to the tribes'
right to reassume exclusive or referral jurisdiction over child custody matters.
Venetie, 944 F.2d at 561. Also, the state court did not apply canons of construction
of Indian law (for example, that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the tribe
and tribal rights cannot be extinguished by implication) to its interpretation of this
provision, while the federal court did. See id. at 561-62.
92. Nenana, 722 P.2d at 222. The court, however, did not define "ability."
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a. State's Authority to Enforce its Civil Regulatory Laws
against Alaska Natives. PL 280's grant of civil jurisdiction to the
states does not include the power to enforce state civil regulatory
laws against Indians living in Indian country. In Bryan v. Itasca
County,' the United States Supreme Court held that the State of
Minnesota could not impose a tax on a reservation Indian. 4 The
Court concluded that if Congress had intended in enacting PL 280
to confer upon the states general civil regulatory powers over
reservation Indians, it would have said so expressly." One
implication of Bryan is that if PL 280 does not confer upon the
states jurisdiction to enforce civil regulatory laws against Indians in
Indian country, then the tribes retain that exclusive jurisdiction.
To determine the scope of this jurisdictional limitation on the
states, it is necessary to identify what laws are civil/regulatory in
nature. The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,96 concluding that
California ordinances regulating tribal bingo operations were civil
regulatory in nature and thus that PL 280 did not authorize the
State to enforce them on the reservation.' 7 In Cabazon, the Court
formulated a shorthand test for distinguishing between civil
regulatory and criminal prohibitory laws: whether the conduct at
issue violates the State's public policy." Lower courts have
consistently applied the Cabazon standard to decide whether a
particular law is civil regulatory or criminal in nature.99
93. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
94. Id. at 378-79; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1988).
95. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 390.
96. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
97. Id. at 208.
98. Id. at 202.
99. See, e.g., Quechan Indian Tribe v. McMullen, 984 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.
1993) (California's fireworks laws not civil/regulatory); Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146, 149 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Washington's traffic law establishing speed limits is civil/regulatory.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1704 (1992); Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 788 F. Supp.
1498, 1503 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (California's slot machine laws are civil/regulatory.).
In Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the traffic regulations on the Colville Reservation in Washington
were civil/regulatory laws; thus, state law enforcement officers lacked jurisdiction
to enforce them. 938 F.2d at 149. Although the State of Washington had assumed
civil and criminal jurisdiction for acts committed by Indians on Indian lands in
eight specific subject areas (including the operation of motor vehicles on public
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b. Tribes' Authority to Enforce Local Ordinances against
Resident Members and Non-members. Many Alaska Native tribes
claim the authority to enforce local ordinances, particularly alcohol
control and minor offenses, against their members (and other
Indians) in their territory."°° In Chilkat Indian Village v. John-
son,'01 the Ninth Circuit indicated that a tribal court is an appro-
priate forum for such disputes. The court evinced this possibility
by refusing to hear the Chilkat Indian Village's claims that some of
its members had violated a village ordinance prohibiting alienation
of artifacts without the permission of the village council.'02 The
Ninth Circuit reasoned that it had no jurisdiction over the claims
against the tribal members because the tribe's attempt to enforce
one of its own ordinances against its own members did not present
a federal question. 3 The court characterized the Chilkat Indian
Tribe's attempts to enforce its ordinance against tribal members as
"the staple of the tribal courts."'' 4
roads), id at 147 n.1, a Washington statute stated that "a traffic infraction may not
be classified as a criminal offense." Id. at 148.
100. See RESOLVING DIsPUTEs LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 35, 39, 40, 44, 52,
53, 59-61, 87. For example, most of the Minto court's cases involve violations of
local ordinances. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at 77. Minto
characterizes these cases as civil/regulatory matters. See Native Village of Minto,
Alaska, Code of Village Regulations § 90.30 (1985) ("All hearings shall be
conducted as civil matters.").
101. 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989).
102. Id. at 1476.
103. Id The court raised, but did not decide, the question of whether some of
the claims might be subject to requirements that tribal court remedies be
exhausted before federal courts would hear the dispute. Id. at 1475 n.11. On
remand, however, the district court held that all parties were required to exhaust
all tribal court remedies, see Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, No. J84-024 (D.
Alaska Oct. 9,1990), and referred the case to the Chilkat Village Tribal Court for
trial on the merits. Id. The trial ended in February 1993. Marilee Enge, Treasure
of the Tlingit: Whose Laws?, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 8,1993, at Al, A6.
The tribal court judge ruled on November 3, 1993 that the artifacts must be
returned to the Ganaxteidi clan in Klukwan. Marilee Enge, Tribal Judge Orders
Tlingit Totems Home, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEwS, Nov. 5, 1993 at Al, A10.
The district court also held that the Chilkat Indian Village is a federally
recognized tribe and is a "dependent Indian Community" classifiable as "Indian
country." Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, No. J84-024 (D. Alaska Oct. 9,1990).
104. Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, No. J84-024 (D. Alaska Oct. 9, 1990).
One of the defendants was a non-Indian, non-resident art dealer. Id. at 1471,
1473. As to the Village's attempt to enforce its ordinance against the non-member
art dealer, the court found that a federal question had been presented because the
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As mentioned above, a related area of concern for tribes is
whether tribal courts have authority to enforce tribal criminal
ordinances against non-member Indians in tribal territory.
Although the United States Supreme Court recently decided that
issue in the negative, Congress legislatively reversed that opinion
in 1991, thereby restoring tribal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians."°5
c. Limitations on State's exercise of jurisdiction. A final
aspect of PL 280's grant of civil jurisdiction is the requirement that
Native "ordinances and customs" be given "full force and effect"
in Alaska state courts whenever they are "not inconsistent" with
any applicable civil law of the State."O' Although the meaning of
this provision has not been litigated, it apparently requires an
Alaska court hearing a civil cause of action arising under PL 280 to
apply tribal law, including customary law, if no inconsistent state
law exists.' °7
B. Jurisdiction Over Criminal Matters
Congress historically has attempted to limit the scope of tribal
criminal jurisdiction. In the late 1800's and early 1900's, Congress
was concerned with "providing effective protection for the Indians"
from the criminal acts of non-Indians. In 1790, Congress assumed
federal jurisdiction over offenses by non-Indians against Indians to
the same extent as if the offense had been committed against a
non-Indian."' 8 In 1885, as Congress became more concerned with
"providing effective protection for the Indians,"'0 9 it expanded
tribe's claim of the sovereign power to enact a valid ordinance, such as one
applicable to non-Indians regulating tribal artifacts on its fee lands, is based on a
disputed federal claim. Id. at 1473.
The result in Chilkat is consistent with an earlier Ninth Circuit case in which
the court held that no federal question was raised by Indian plaintiffs who sought
to contest the results of a tribal election on the ground that tribal election laws of
undisputed validity had been violated. See Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Communi-
ty, 642 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1981).
105. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), rev'd by 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1991).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c) (1988).
107. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 366.
108. Id. (citing 1 Stat. 137 (citing Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137
(1790), and Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1152 (1988)).
109. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 201 (1978).
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federal criminal jurisdiction over serious offenses committed by or
against Indians in Indian country ° More recently, the United
States Supreme Court has decided that tribes have no criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country. 1' PL 280 worked
yet another change in the tribal-federal-state balance of criminal
jurisdiction by extending to the mandatory PL 280 states a measure
of criminal jurisdiction over crimes throughout Indian country
within the states' borders."2  The remainder of this section
110. The Indian Major Crimes Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153,3242 (1988).
The Act was passed in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), which held that tribes generally retained their
jurisdiction to try an Indian for a crime committed against another Indian within
Indian country. COHEN, supra note 19, at 300.
111. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195. Cohen suggests that most traditional non-penal
sanctions may still be imposed on members of tribal society and that exclusion
from tribal territory may be the only action that can be imposed on non-Indians.
See COHEN, supra note 19, at 336.
112. The criminal jurisdictional grant of PL 280 provides that:
Each of the States listed ... shall have jurisdiction over offenses
committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed...
to the same extent that such State or Territory has jurisdiction over
offenses committed elsewhere within the State or Territory, and the
criminal laws of such State or Territory shall have the same force and
effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State
Alaska .... All Indian country within the State, except that on Annette
Islands, the Metlakatla Indian community may exercise jurisdiction over
offenses committed by Indians in the same manner in which such
jurisdiction may be exercised by Indian tribes in Indian country over
which State jurisdiction has not been extended.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988). For the language of the civil jurisdictional grant, see
supra note 62.
In Alaska, members of the Metlakatla Indian Community (Annette Islands
Reserve) experienced one of the administrative burdens created by this grant. The
Metlakatla residents belatedly learned that they no longer retained previously
exercised criminal jurisdiction over minor offenses. CASE, supra note 64, at 456.
Because no state troopers or magistrates worked in Metlakatla, inadequate law
enforcement on the reservation resulted under PL 280. 115 CONG. REc. 3225-26
(daily ed. Feb. 7,1969) (remarks of Sen. Gravel). Consequently, in 1970, Congress
passed an exception to PL 280's criminal jurisdictional grant that conferred
concurrent criminal jurisdiction on the Metlakatla Community. Act of Nov. 25,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1162(a) (1988)). The problems faced by the Metlakatla residents remain today,
however, as it is generally acknowledged that budget constraints hamper Alaska's
efforts to provide satisfactory law enforcement in the vast and remote rural areas
of the state. OTWIN MARENIN & GARY COPUS, POLICING RURAL ALASKA: THE
VILLAGE PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICER ("VPSO") PROGRAM 1 (1989); RESOLVING
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discusses several of these congressional enactments affecting tribal
criminal jurisdiction.
1. Public Law 280. As with PL 280's grant of civil jurisdic-
tion, there is disagreement as to whether Congress intended the
tribes and the State to share concurrent criminal jurisdiction.
Those who believe criminal jurisdiction to be concurrent argue that
in enacting PL 280, Congress intended only to substitute state for
federal jurisdiction in the existing system.' According to this
view, prior to PL 280, the federal government and Indian tribes
shared criminal jurisdiction (unless jurisdiction had been otherwise
transferred), and with PL 280, the federal government transferred
its share of this concurrent jurisdiction to the states.
Others argue that a 1970 amendment to PL 280 suggests that
Congress interpreted the original transfer of jurisdiction to the
states to be wholly exclusive."' The amendment adds language
expressly enabling the Metlakatla Indian Community to exercise
concurrent criminal jurisdiction over the Annette Islands Reserve
in Alaska,"5 and it refers to mandatory PL 280 states as "areas
over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction."" 6
Other evidence that Alaska's PL 280 criminal jurisdiction is
exclusive consists of remarks made by members of Congress both
when Alaska was added as a PL 280 state and when the Metlakatla
DISPUTES LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at A-6 (Susanne Di Pietro, Memorandum
regarding Summary of Bush Justice Conference Recommendations 11 (May 2,
1990)).
113. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 348.
114. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 66, at 142.
115. See supra note 112.
116. COHEN, supra note 19, at 345. However, Cohen concludes that the
legislative history surrounding the 1970 amendment is ambiguous, and that the
phrase "exclusive jurisdiction" is most naturally read to mean only exclusive of
federal jurisdiction with no intent to affect tribal jurisdiction. Id. Cohen explains
that the Metlakatla language was included to respond to confusion created at least
in part by the decision in United States v. Booth, 161 F. Supp. 269 (1958), which
held that the Metlakatla Reservation was not Indian country. COHEN, supra note
19, at 345 nn.138, 139. Other legislative history suggests that the Metlakatla
amendment was sought as a prophylactic measure only, in case it was later decided
that Public Law 280 silently extinguished tribal criminal law enforcement
jurisdiction. Letter from Lloyd B. Miller, supra note 28, at 6. Others respond that
the assumptions or beliefs of the amending Congress in 1970 should not be
dispositive of the beliefs or intent of the enacting Congress. See, e.g., Consumer
Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE, 447 U.S. 102, 119 (1980).
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bill was introduced,"7 remarks that support the interpretation that
PL 280 divested the tribes of their retained criminal jurisdic-
tion."'
The courts also have failed to provide a definitive statement of
PL 280's criminal jurisdictional grant. In Walker v. Rushing,"9
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that PL 280 "did
not itself divest Indian tribes of their sovereign power to punish
their own members for violations of tribal law. Nothing in the
wording of [PL] 280 or its legislative history precludes concurrent
tribal authority."'2  The Eighth Circuit concluded that the
Omaha Tribe could prosecute a member of the Omaha Tribe in the
tribal court for violation of the tribal code."'
The Alaska state courts have not addressed the issue of
whether tribal and state courts concurrently share criminal
jurisdiction. In Harrison v. State," however, the Alaska Court
of Appeals rejected a defense based on an assertion that a tribal
court had exclusive jurisdiction over the offense. The defendant, an
Athabascan Indian, moved to dismiss a reckless driving charge on
the ground that the State lacked jurisdiction to prosecute because
the Chickaloon Village Traditional Court had exclusive jurisdic-
tion." Interpreting PL 280, the court held that "Indian tribal
courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal offenses
committed by Alaska Natives in Alaska even if these offenses occur
in 'Indian Country.""' 24 The court expressly declined to consider
117. REPORT OF THE GOvERNOR's TASK FORCE, supra note 66, at 142 (citing
S. REP. No. 902, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)).
118. The legislative history consists of remarks by Representative Kenneth B.
Keating, the Judiciary Committee member who managed the bill on the floor of
the House of Representatives; remarks by the bill's sponsor, Alaska Senator Mike
Gravel; parts of the report of the subcommittee to which the bill was referred in
the Senate; parts of the report of the members of the Committee on the Judiciary
who reported the bill to the Senate floor; comments from the Department of the
Interior; and remarks from Representative Howard Pollock, Alaska's only member
of the House of Representatives. Id.
119. 898 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1990).
120. Id. at 675.
121. Id. The defendant was driving on a public road on the Omaha Indian
Reservation when she struck and killed two persons, also members of the tribe.
Id. at 672.
122. 784 P.2d 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
123. Id. at 682.
124. Id. at 683.
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whether Alaska's jurisdiction might be concurrent with that of the
tribal court, stating that the issue was not adequately briefed."
2. The Indian Major Crimes Act. In 1885 Congress restricted
tribal criminal jurisdiction by enacting the Indian Major Crimes Act
("IMCA"), 1 which extended federal jurisdiction to certain types
of serious criminal conduct by Indians against other Indians within
Indian country.27 Although it has acknowledged the issue, the
United States Supreme Court has not decided whether IMCA
divested tribes of jurisdiction over major crimes."
Subsequent congressional enactments have modified IMCA's
jurisdictional grant. First, PL 280 altered the scope of the grant by
repealing IMCA insofar as it applied to those areas covered by PL
280.129 The leading treatise on Native law, Felix S. Cohen's
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, has concluded that the "intent
of the criminal law section [of PL 280] was to substitute state for
federal jurisdiction under the Indian Country Crimes Act and
IMCA."'3 Thus, the federal government gave to PL 280 states
the power to prosecute the crimes covered by IMCA.
The Indian Civil Rights Act1 " ("ICRA") also altered the
jurisdictional effect of IMCA. The United States Supreme Court
has held that the issue of whether the federal government has
"exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes was mooted for all
practical purposes by the passage of [ICRA] which limits the
punishment that can be imposed by Indian tribal courts."' 2
ICRA's other jurisdictional ramifications are discussed below.
125. Id at 683 n.2.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1988).
127. COHEN, supra note 19, at 300. Crimes currently covered by IMCA include
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, maiming, incest, assault with intent to
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious
bodily injury, arson, burglary and robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1988).
128. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c) (1988) ("The provisions of [18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and
1153] shall not be applicable within areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a)
of this section as areas over which the several States have exclusive jurisdiction.").
130. COHEN, supra note 19, at 344.
131. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1988). ICRA is contained within the 1968 Civil
Rights Act. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73.
132. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203 n.14.
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3. The Indian Civil Rights Act. ICRA, passed by Congress
in 1968, has provisions affecting both the substantive rights of
tribal members and tribal court procedures. Generally, ICRA
infringes on tribal powers of self-government "by imposing certain
restrictions upon tribal governments similar, but not identical, to
those contained in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'" ICRA's purpose was to prevent perceived injustices
perpetrated by tribal governments while at the same time minimiz-
ing congressional interference with tribal autonomy and self-
governance. 35
Many of ICRA's provisions concern tribal criminal justice
systems. For example, ICRA guarantees certain rights: (1) the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; (2) not to
be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense; (3) not to incrimi-
nate oneself; (4) to a speedy and public trial; (5) to confrontation
and cross-examination at trial; (6) to counsel at the defendant's
own expense; (7) to trial by jury in criminal cases; (8) to due
process and equal protection of the laws; and (9) not to be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment or excessive bail. 36
For villages wishing to start tribal courts in Alaska, providing
for ICRA's constitutional guarantees could require re-examining
some traditional practices. For example, the Minto tribal court
traditionally has operated with a strong regard for the confidenti-
ality of the proceedings. However, a policy of closed hearings and
confidentiality may not always be compatible with ICRA's
guarantee of a public trial at the defendant's request.137
ICRA conferred broad jurisdiction on tribal courts to resolve
disputes arising under its provisions. With the exception of habeas
corpus petitions, tribal members claiming that their rights under
133. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 73, 77 (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988)).
134. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 57 (1978). See also COHEN,
supra note 19, at 336. ICRA also limits the punishment that can be imposed by
Indian tribal courts to a term of one year imprisonment or a fine of $5000. 25
U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988). The 1968 Act limited sanctions to six months imprison-
ment and no greater than a $500 fine. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1969), amended
by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570 sec. 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146.
135. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 62-66 (1978)
136. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303 (1988).
137. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at 73-74.
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ICRA have been violated must press those claims in tribal
court.13 The United States Supreme Court held in 1978 that
ICRA does not authorize a private cause of action in federal court
for declaratory and injunctive relief against a tribal govern-
ment.3 9  The Court reasoned that suits against tribes under
ICRA are barred from suit by tribal sovereign immunity, and that
ICRA does not contain the unequivocal waiver of immunity that
would be necessary to allow such a suit °1
V. CONCLUSION
The legal authority of tribal courts in Alaska to hear and
decide disputes among members of their communities currently is
not formally recognized by the State of Alaska or its court system,
largely because the State does not accede to Alaska Native tribes'
claims of sovereignty or the existence of Indian country in Alaska.
Yet tribal courts function in Alaska on a regular basis,' and the
State (both through its judges and magistrates, and through
executive branch agencies including the Department of Public
Safety and the Division of Family and Youth Services) routinely
interacts at an informal level with these tribal courts and tribal
councils. 42
The Alaska Judicial Council found that state agencies and
groups can benefit from interaction with tribal courts." For
example, a village's tribal court can assist a state social worker by
arranging a child's temporary or permanent placement,' a
138. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65 ("Tribal forums are available to
vindicate rights created by ICRA, and § 1302 has the substantial and intended
effect of changing the law which these forums are obliged to apply."). Federal
courts have jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1988).
139. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 52.
140. Id. at 59.
141. RESOLVING DIsPUTES LOCALLY I, supra note 1, at 113.
142. Id. at 95-96.
143. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at 171; RESOLVING
DISPUTES LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 113.
144. A successful example of this type of cooperation occurs in the Dillingham
area, where the Dillingham based state social worker works with tribal councils or
courts in Dillingham, Ekwok, Manokotak, New Stuyahok and Togiak in child-in-
need-of-aid cases. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 103 n.192.
The tribal organizations monitor families' progress and report back to the social




Village Public Safety Officer ("VPSO")145 can refer violations of
village ordinances to the tribal court instead of calling Troopers to
the village and transporting the defendant to the nearest state court
location." Villages also benefit from such interaction because
they can achieve a measure of local control over the affairs of the
villagers. 47
Until the federal-state split of authority on the sovereignty
issue and Indian country is resolved, the scope of PL 280's
jurisdictional grant will be interpreted differently by the Alaska
State courts and the federal courts. An interim legal approach that
supports the State's informal interaction with tribal courts and
councils is to categorize all of the various local means of adjudicat-
ing or conciliating disputes as alternative dispute resolution
processes. The benefit of this approach is that it permits interac-
tion without reference to the controversial issues of sovereignty and
Indian country. The disadvantage to this approach, at least from
the perspective of tribal advocates, is that state agencies are free to
interact with the tribal courts without recognizing tribal sovereign
status. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the benefits to both the
145. The VPSO is responsible for fire fighting, boat safety, first aid and law
enforcement in the village. The VPSO program was established originally in 1982
in the Department of Public Safety. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY H, supra
note 1, at 99. In 1993, it was statutorily established as an official responsibility of
the Department of Public Safety, enabling the department to adopt regulations
establishing criteria for entry and participation in the program, and to implement
training standards. Midwives and VPSOs subject of new measures signed into law
by Governor Walter Hickel, TUNDRA TIMEs 7 (Week of June 16, 1993). The
Department of Public Safety contracts with village governments to hire and
supervise the VPSOs. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 99. In
1992, eighty-five villages had VPSOs, and an additional thirty-nine had unfilled
VPSO slots. Telephone Interview of Alaska Department of Public Safety
representative by Teresa W. Cams, Senior Staff Associate, Alaska Judicial Council
(November 1992). VPSOs receive six weeks of training at the Department of
Public Safety's Training Academy in Sitka. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY II,
supra note 1, at 100.
146. An example of this practice occurs in Minto, where the VPSO works
closely with the Minto Tribal Court. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY I, supra
note 14, at 77. The Fairbanks District Attorney attributes Minto's low rates of
reported crime and prosecutions to successful operation of a tribal court. Id. at
85.
147. RESOLVING DISPUTES LOCALLY II, supra note 1, at 103.
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State and the villages from mutual informal cooperation outweigh
the disadvantages."¢
148. After evaluating the work of the Sitka and Minto Tribal Courts, the Alaska
Judicial Council recommended that the State and Tribes foster a mutually
cooperative attitude toward the legitimate work of Tribal courts. RESOLVING
DISPUTES LOCALLY I, supra note 14, at 173. In its follow up report, the Council
reiterated its recommendation for cooperation and its neutrality on the issues of
Native sovereignty and tribal court jurisdiction. RESOLVING DISPUTES LocALLY
II, supra note 1, at 114.
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